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Abstract: While the aggregate macroeconomic analysis of the recent Asian Crisis highlights the moral 
hazard problem of bad loans in poorly supervised and regulated East Asian economies, there is very 
little  firm-level  analysis  to  characterize  it.  The  present  paper  attempts  to  fill  in  this  gap  of  the 
literature  and  focuses  on  the  process  of  dynamic  adjustment  of  the  actual  leverage  towards  the 
optimum. Our results based on the Worldscope firm-level panel data indicate a close correspondence 
between excess leverage  and excess capital stock and also reveal signs of corporate inertia. This 
inertia has been evident not only among firms with excess capital stock, but also among those with 
larger share of short-term debt in the worst affected countries, especially during the pre-crisis and 
crisis periods; the adjustment process was however speeded up in the post-crisis period. One possible 
way out of this problem of bad loans would be to develop the equity market and induce the firms to 
rely more on equity finance. 
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Dynamic Adjustment of Corporate Leverage: a 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The existing literature on the recent Asian crisis highlights the problem of bad loans and 
moral hazard in capital markets. Much of this analysis is carried out at the aggregate level, 
and highlights the problem of excessive borrowing and over-investment (see for example 
Krugman, 1998; Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999a,b). The well-understood moral hazard 
problems were exacerbated by the bail-out policies of the governments of the crisis countries, 
and the lack of supervision of the financial sector. The result was financing of unprofitable 
projects  and  cash  shortfalls  with  external  borrowing  causing  overinvestment  and  lower 
returns, paving the way for the crisis. However, there is very little firm level analysis seeking 
to determine the nature and scale of the moral hazard problem. This paper is an attempt to fill 
this gap, with particular focus on the levels of leverage in these economies, and the process of 
corporate adjustment. This is an important exercise, because this analysis directly addresses 
the question of how firms choose and adjust their capital structure towards the optimal level. 
In the context of the Asian Crisis, this provides a hitherto unavailable analysis of the extent of 
the  moral  hazard  problem  of  bad  loans,  discussed  but  seldom  analysed  in  the  existing 
literature. 
This paper then draws together two strands of the literature. Firstly, a key feature in 
the  macroeconomic  analysis  of  the  crisis  is  the  importance  of  moral  hazard  in  the  loan 
market. We integrate this crisis literature with a second strand of more established literature, 
concerned with the choice of optimum capital structure in corporate finance.
2 Much of the 
literature concerning the determination of a firm’s optimum capital structure is based on the 
seminal  analysis  of  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958,  1963)  who  argued  that  leverage  is 
independent of firm value. More recent trade-off models assume that firms determine their 
optimal  leverage  by  comparing  the  costs  and  benefits  of  an  additional  unit  of  debt. 
Considerations of bankruptcy and agency costs will therefore modify the central hypothesis 
of  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958),  as  will  different  tax  treatments  of  debt  or  interest 
                                                
2 Though there is a sizeable literature on the theory and evidence on optimal capital structure, most analyses are 
done in static framework and that too primarily for the US corporations (e.g., see Titman and Wessels, 1988) 
and other industrialised countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) with the single exception of Welch (2004) who 
examined the debt ratio dynamics for US corporations (see further discussion in section 3).    2
repayments. Further, the existence of information asymmetries will lead to retained earnings 
and debt being viewed as preferable methods of finance rather than new equity, especially 
when that equity is under priced. Secondly, in the presence of bankruptcy costs, there is a 
limit to how much risky debt can be issued before new equity is preferred. Thus, leverage 
will be dependent on the net present value (NPV) so that firms with higher NPV are more 
likely to issue debt. This argument is expounded in a theoretical literature that can be traced 
back to Ross (1977), Leland and Pyle (1977) who predict a positive correlation between firm 
quality and leverage. Similar arguments are found in Brennan and Kraus (1987), Kale and 
Noe (1991).  
Perhaps for our purpose it is more pertinent to consider the literature that seeks to 
move  away  from  static  models  of  leverage  and  focuses  in  stead  on  dynamic  adjustment 
process. A common theme in this strand of the literature is that the actual and the desired  (or 
optimal) leverage may not be equal at any time because of market disturbances or desired 
leverage may change over time. Market frictions such as transaction costs and capital market 
imperfections may prevent an instantaneous adjustment of the actual leverage to the desired 
level. As a result the rate at which a firm decreases the gap between the actual and desired 
leverage provides an approximate measure of the relative adjustment costs faced by the firm.  
There is a relatively limited literature on dynamic modelling of capital structure, and 
the  focus  of  such  work  has  generally  been  on  the  transaction  costs  associated  with  the 
adjustment process. For example, Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) argue that even small 
recapitalization costs could lead to wide swings in a firm’s debt ratio over time. Conversely, 
Leland (1998) emphasises the role of agency costs of debt in determining optimal leverage. 
Much of  the  US literature is couched in terms of firms facing a crisis  in the form  of a 
devaluation of its equity, and therefore tending to exhibit sub-optimal levels of leverage and 
thus seek to increase them. As such, the possibility of asymmetric adjustment costs or non-
linearity in the adjustment process is seldom discussed within the existing partial adjustment 
literature. This is particularly pertinent when one considers the different costs involved in the 
directions of adjustment in general and also the reverse scenario as in the case of SE Asian 
firms.  
The  moral  hazard  problems  of  corporate  borrowing  among  the  East  Asian  firms 
resulted in excessive levels of financing, with the observed capital stock often exceeding the 
optimal (for further discussion of this see Corsetti et al., 1999a,b, Demetriades et al. 2001). 
An important question is therefore the extent to which firms have deviated from their optimal 
levels of capital and what, if any, determines their inclination/ability to adjust their capital   3
structure towards the desired level. While small adjustments in leverage may be seen as not 
cost  effective, previous evidence suggests that average adjustment rates are  slow  for US 
firms,  see  for  example  Fama  and  French  (2002),  Baker  and  Wurgler  (2002)  and  Welch 
(2004). This however may in part be due to the methodologies employed, and the fact that 
they  obtain  only  average  adjustment  rates  across  the  various  samples  employed.  In  the 
context of East Asian firms, the persistent failure to adjust to the optimal leverage could, 
among other things, be taken to be a measure of moral hazard in poorly supervised and 
regulated East Asian economies. Though the importance of the moral hazard argument is 
emphasized in the literature, there is rarely any attempt to quantify it at the firm level as we 
propose to do.  
We investigate the determinants of the speed of the adjustment process, and model the 
extent to which these changed before, during or after the crisis. Our analysis is based on 
leverage  rates  for  firms  taken  from  the  Worldscope  firm-level  data  from  the  four  worst 
affected countries, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. We then compare the capital 
structure, and adjustment behaviour of firms in these countries with those in Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan, countries relatively unaffected by the Crisis. The results presented 
here suggest that optimal leverage was lower for more profitable firms and also for firms with 
higher market valuation. Dynamic estimates of speed of adjustment however suggest a close 
correspondence between excess capital stock and excess leverage. A significant degree of 
corporate inertia is also evident among firms with excess capital stock or high share of short-
term loans in the worst affected countries. These results seem to strengthen the moral hazard 
argument  of  bad  loans  in  the  poorly  regulated  and  relatively  unsupervised  East  Asian 
economies of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. 
The paper is developed as follows. Section 2 describes the data and section 3 explains 
the analytical framework. Section 4 presents and analyses the empirical results while section 
5 concludes.  
 
 
2.   THE DATA AND INITIAL ANALYSIS 
The analysis is based on the Worldscope firm-level data. Here we extend the Worldscope 
firm-level data used in Driffield and Pal (2001, 2004) in two ways: Firstly, in addition to 
countries badly affected by the crisis, namely, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, for 
comparison we include Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, which were relatively unaffected   4
by the crisis. Secondly, we extend the data beyond the crisis period. This enables us to trace 
the patterns of recovery, if any, in these countries.  
  The number of firms in each country with and without outliers is summarised in Table 
1  for  each  year.  However,  there  is  a  problem  of  missing  observations  for  many  firms, 
especially during the early years, e.g., 1989-93. In order however to carry out the dynamic 
analysis discussed above, we construct sub-sample of firms with at least four consecutive 
years of data, which resulted in smaller sample for each country for the period 1993-2002 
(see Appendix Table A1).   
 
2.1 Analysis of capital Structures. 
This paper focuses on the behaviour of corporate leverage and its dynamics in the sample 
countries. Here corporate leverage is defined as total debt divided by common equity (book 
value); this ratio is alternatively labelled as the debt-equity ratio. Firms choose their optimal 
capital structure based on the relative costs and benefits of internal and external finance. 
Further, agency costs, bankruptcy costs and taxes play an important role, as do institutional 
factors, ranging from stock market development, legal protection of shareholders/creditors, 
and government control of the financial sector influencing the corporate capital structure in a 
given country. It is clear that many of these are country level phenomena, with differences 
therein  suggesting  different  determinants  of  leverage  across  countries.  By  focussing  our 
analysis on each country separately, we are able to highlight import inter-country differences, 
while focusing within countries on firm-specific factors (both real and financial) affecting the 
determination of optimum capital structure and its adjustment in a dynamic framework.  
  The analysis commences by considering the distribution of internal and external funds 
before (1989-96), during (1997-98) and after (1999-2002) the crisis as summarised in Table 
2. In general there was a greater dependence on external finance in all countries in the pre-
crisis period. External finance accounted for about 65% of total finance in Korea followed by 
Thailand (37%), Indonesia (35%) and Malaysia (30%). After the crisis, the average ratio of 
external finance in total finance declined in all the worst affected countries: it decreased by 
some 26% in Thailand, 23% in Indonesia, 10% in Korea and 7% in Malaysia. In contrast, the 
average share of external finance in total finance in the least affected countries was modest 
(ranging between 25%-32%) and did not change perceptibly after the crisis.  
Subsequently, we consider the composition of debt and equity in external finance. 
Compared with the least affected countries there seems to be a greater reliance on debt in the   5
worst affected countries throughout this period though the highest in each case was observed 
during the crisis period. Following the crisis, however, the share of debt generally decreased 
in all these countries though the decrease was more perceptible in Korea where the average 
share of debt was even lower than that in the pre-crisis period average. The latter has been 
accompanied by a gradual increase in the share of new equity finance in external finance in 
the post-crisis period though clearly the reliance on equity has been much higher in Hong 
Kong and Singapore.  
  One possible problem is that the debt-equity ratio defined this way could be negative 
if the book value of common equity is negative. However a negative debt-equity ratio does 
not  necessarily  mean  low  leverage;  in  fact  in  most  cases  negative  debt-equity  ratio  is 
associated  with  very  high  external  debt.  A  simple  way  to  address  this  problem  for  our 
purpose is to make use of the absolute debt-equity ratio instead - this is what we would be 
doing in much of our analysis.  
Table 3 summarises the annual descriptive statistics for leverage rates for each of 
these countries. Interestingly, the average for absolute leverage (|DE|) was less than 1 in the 
least affected countries in contrast to the worst affected countries, notably Korea. While the 
average |DE| remained around 2 during 1989-90, it suddenly shoot up in 1991 from 2.41 to 
3.19. The latter was followed by some downward adjustment during 1992-93, which again 
spiralled  up  as  the  crisis  approached.  Thus  there  seems  to  be  a  bimodal  distribution  of 
leverage  in  the  Korean case,  one  observed  in  1991-92  while  the second one  in 1997-98 
though the latter was more pronounced. In comparison, there seems to be a relatively steady 
average |DE| in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand during 1989-1993 that gradually increased 
as the crisis approached.  
It  is  well  documented  that  many  East  Asian  corporations  in  the  worst  affected 
countries were heavily reliant on debt during this period. A rapid rise in the value of debt was 
due  to the revaluation of  dollar-dominated  debt  (attributable  to the collapse  of exchange 
rates),  which  was  not  hedged.  Equally,  anecdotal  evidence  identifies  a  number  of  other 
explanations for high levels of debt, including large shareholders’ desire to keep control of 
the management by increasing leverage rather than equity (thus preventing dilution of their 
ownership), low real interest rates on bank loans and poor financial and corporate governance 
indulging over- lending by banks, decline in equity value. 
Table 4 shows the period-specific averages of leverage, and some other indicators of 
firm  performance  across  these  sub-periods.  It  indicates  several  potential  problems  across 
firms in these countries in the run up to the crisis period. The average value of cash flow to   6
current liabilities in all countries, especially the worst affected ones, was declining. This was 
accompanied further by decreases in both interest coverage (interest payments as a share of 
EBIT
3) and debt coverage (interest payments plus principal as a share of EBIT) ratios in all 
the worst affected countries. Many firms in the worst affected countries also exhibit negative 
equity values
4 in the build-up to the crisis period, generally after 1994. The proportion of 
firms with negative equity during the pre-crisis period is the highest in Korea (18.9%), while 
there were no firms in Singapore or Taiwan that had negative equity during this period. With 
a rapid depreciation of currencies exchange rate, some firms became technically insolvent 
which could partly be reflected in negative equity valuations.  
It  is  also  possible  to  detect  some  signs  of  recovery  in  all  of  the  worst  affected 
countries in the post-crisis period. For example, the average debt-equity ratio was gradually 
adjusted downwards (especially visible from around 2000) while shares of tangible assets 
slowly increased in all these countries. This was accompanied not only by a gradual increase 
in interest and debt coverage ratios, but also by an increase in cash flow in relation to current 
liability  in  all  the  worst  affected  countries  in  the  post-crisis  period.  The  proportion  of 
observations with negative equity was almost halved in Korea while the adjustment in this 
respect was not so pronounced elsewhere. In fact, the proportion firms with negative equity 
increased in Indonesia and Malaysia in the post-crisis period.   
Figure 1 shows the trend in average annual debt-equity ratios (absolute) while Figure 
2 shows the trend in share of tangible assets to total assets over the 14-years period 1989-
2002. These figures clearly demonstrate that compared with firms in other countries Korean 
firms maintained a much higher debt-equity ratio throughout the pre-crisis period.
5 Also, 
while average debt-equity ratios increased dramatically from 1993 onwards, there were only 
modest increases in the share of tangible assets in all the worst affected countries. In contrast, 
average shares of tangible assets were much higher in Hong Kong and Taiwan over this 
period,  with  much  smaller  fluctuations  in  both  average  debt  equity  ratios  and  share  of 
tangible assets. After the crisis, the average debt-equity was reduced in all countries, but most 
markedly in Korea and Indonesia, generally stabilising around 2000. 
 
 
                                                
3 Earnings before interest and Taxes. 
4 Number of observations in each sample with negative equity is as follows:  5.3% in Korea and Thailand, 7.5% 
in Indonesia and 4.7% in Malaysia. In comparison, number of observations in the countries least affected by the 
Crisis was much smaller: only 0.2% in Taiwan, 0.6% in Singapore and 1.2% in Hong Kong.  
5 Among other things, this could be the result of lower stock market development in Korea compared with say 
Malaysia (see Demirguc-Künt and Maksimovic, 1995).   7
3.   A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF LEVERAGE 
Existing empirical research on the dynamics of firms’ capital structure is often limited by the 
absence of panel data with an adequate time series, as well as unavailability of certain key 
variables. Most existing analysis is based on the hypothesis of a target leverage level for the 
firm, tested on cross sectional data within a country, usually the US (e.g., Welch, 2004)
6 or 
the UK. This  cross  sectional  analysis  omits a good deal  of necessary information. More 
recently, in order to increase the degrees of freedom in such studies, data have been pooled, 
but then these models ignore the possibility of serial correlation, or structural breaks between 
years. More importantly, because of the latent variable problem, many studies tend to use 
observed debt level as a proxy for optimal debt level (e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995, Hovakimian et al, 2001) and then seek to explain how firms periodically 
adjust their capital structures towards a target ratio. This is the framework within a static 
reduced form trade-off model, determined by the relative costs and benefits of adjustment.  
Although we generally follow this tradition, our analysis is distinctive in a number of ways.  
Firstly, we allow for three distinct sub-periods in our data. The average |DE| for each 
country tends to vary between three distinct sub-periods, the pre-crisis, crisis and the post-
crisis periods (see Table 4). This is likely to generate instability in any model of leverage 
over time.  
The second issue relates to the treatment of the process of dynamic adjustment of 
leverage when the actual leverage deviates from the optimum. Firms may not find it easy to 
adjust their debt ratios frequently or fully, even if they are aware of the implied inefficiency. 
Much of the literature views adjustment in leverage as a uni-directional process. Heshmati 
(2002) for example attempts to differentiate between the observed and the estimated optimal 
debt ratio levels, where observed leverage is less than the corresponding optimum. However, 
we allow adjustment in leverage to  be in opposite direction, an issue that  is particularly 
relevant  in  the  context  of  the  SE  Asian  crisis.  Over-lending  and  over-investment  were 
common in the pre-crisis period (commonly attributable to the moral hazard problems of bad 
loans and weak corporate governance) so that actual leverage is likely to exceed the optimal 
leverage. We highlight this case in our econometric modelling and attempt to relate evidence 
of inertia in the speed of adjustment to the moral hazard problem. In doing so, we deviate 
from the standard practice in two ways: (i) we include two sets of adjustment parameters 
                                                
6 In examining the debt ratio dynamics for the US corporations, Welch focuses on the role of stock returns and 
argues that firms do not immediately readjust. Firms whose debt ratio increase (decrease) because of poor 
(good) stock returns performances seem to use their issuing activities not to readjust, but to amplify the stock 
return changes.    8
capturing different effects within the partial adjustment model. (ii) We allow the speed of 
adjustment parameter bit to vary between firms and over time. The modelling process is 
explained in detail below. 
 
 
3.1. A Model of Dynamic Adjustment 
Our central focus is on the moral hazard problem as the common source of excessive external 
borrowing in a poorly supervised economy. If private agents act under the presumption that 
there exist public guarantees on corporate and financial investment, the return on domestic 
assets is perceived as being implicitly insured against adverse circumstances. Where lenders 
are willing to lend against future bail out revenue, unprofitable projects and cash shortfalls 
would be refinanced through external borrowing. In the absence of any significant growth in 
tangible  assets,  this  generates  excessive  corporate  leverage.  It  is  in  this  context  that  we 
examine the process of adjustment of actual leverage towards the long run optimum. 
Let the optimal leverage of a firm i at time t be  *
it DE , which varies across firms as 
well  as  over  time.  In  the  absence  of  any  market  imperfection,  and  with  instantaneous 
adjustment, the observed leverage of firm i at time t  it DE would be equal to its optimal, i.e. 
*
it it DE DE = .  If,  however,  adjustments  are  costly,  for  example  due  to  agency  and/or 
transaction  costs)  *
it it DE DE <   or  if  loans  are  not  well  regulated  (e.g.,  due  to  weak 
governance and moral hazards problems),  *
it it DE DE > . In either case, firms may fail to 
adjust completely to the optimal level.  
In  these  circumstances,  the  movement  of  leverage  over  time  becomes  a  partial 
adjustment process, of the form:   
it it it it it it DE DE DE DE e D g b a D + + - + = - -
* *
1 1 ) (        (1) 
where
*
it DE  is the equilibrium level of leverage while  it DE  is the observed level for firm i in 
the current period t. Thus changes in leverage are determined by two components, namely, 
(a) its and adjustment towards the optimum for the previous period (
*
1 - it DE ) and (b) the 
annual change in the optimal leverage over the current period (D
*
it DE ). 
Much of the previous literature in this area, discussed in detail in Roberts (2002) 
essentially  specifies  a  simple  dynamic  linear  modelling  approach  to  the  adjustment  in   9
leverage. As such, an implied speed of adjustment is generated from the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable. This is problematic, as strictly this measures the rate at which a 
series converges on its long run level, rather than capturing annual adjustments in the face of 
changes in other explanatory variables. In response to this, more recent literature employs a 
partial adjustment model of the form:  
it it it it DE DE E D e b a D + - + = - - ) (
*
1 1
        (1’) 
It is clear therefore that there is a crucial difference between specification (1), and the 
more common specification (1’) criticised by Leary and Roberts (2005). The standard model 
(1’) ignores the effects of changes in the optimal level of leverage, and merely focuses on the 
move  towards  the  previous  optimal  level.  Also,  unlike  the  standard  model  of  partial 
adjustment we allow b to vary among firms and over time as captured by the firm and year-
specific adjustment parameter bit’s. In turn, we seek to explain differences in the speed of 
adjustment  across  firms,  and  identify  significant  heterogeneity  in  the  speed,  even  within 
countries. 
As  such,  the  two  parameters  in  our  model  (1),  bit’s  and  g  can  be  thought  of  as 
capturing different effects within the partial adjustment model. On the one hand, bit is the 
speed of adjustment of a firm i in period t as it measures the degree of adjustment per period. 
For example, if bit = 1, i-th firm will adjust its leverage fully to its optimum from period t-1 
to period t (i.e., within one period). If, however, bit <1, then the adjustment from year t-1 to t 
falls short of the adjustment required to attain the target. In contrast, bit could also exceed 
unity suggesting that from period t-1 to period t, the firm fully adjusts within a given year. 
Fama and French (2002) found the estimate of speed to be much smaller than would be 
suggested by market efficiency. Several reasons for b being significantly less than 0.5 have 
been put forward in the literature, based on inefficiency of capital markets for example. If, 
however,  the  moral  hazard  problem  is  particularly  significant,  firms  do  not  come  under 
pressure to make adjustments even in the face of external shocks. As such, in the economies 
we are discussing here, where agency problems are found to generate significant frictions in 
capital markets, one would hypothesize that b will be small. It is argued that the speed of 
adjustment bit would vary with the factors affecting the externality of adjustment in poorly 
supervised and regulated economies and could thus be taken to be a measure of the moral 
hazard in corporate financing in these east Asian countries (see further discussion in section 
3.1.2).  The  second  adjustment  term,  g,  reflects  a  firms  ability  to  respond  internally  to   10
disequilibrium, i.e., move towards a more efficient level of leverage in response to change in 
the optimal (
*
it DE D ) during the year. g then reflects the ability of firms to respond to changes 
in an attempt to become more efficient.  
 
3.1.1. Determination of optimum leverage  
Determination  of  optimum  leverage  is  central  to  an  analysis  of  the  dynamics  of  the 
debt/equity ratios. There is a well-developed literature (see for example Hovakimian et al 
(2001), Hovakimian (2003) and Leary and Roberts (2005)) that seeks to explain variations in 
leverage, and uses observed leverage to generate predictions or estimates of the optimum 
leverage. This approach also provides an insight into the process of adjustment of the actual 
leverage toward the firm specific optimum.   
Suppose a standard random effects model of leverage for a firm i, i = 1,2,…,I , in 




it t i it it
+ =





           (2)  
 where uit = fi + mt+ eit .
7 
The list of variables generally used in much of this literature includes; investment (or 
growth)  opportunities,  firm  size,  industry  level  effects,  tax  rate  differentials,  and  the 
probability of failure. It is immediately apparent that such effects can seldom be captured 
directly, but rely on proxies. A literature has developed discussing the suitability of these 
proxies, and availability of instruments where problems of endogeneity arise, see for example 
Friend and Lang (1988), Titman and Wessels (1988), Berger et al (1997) Baker and Wurgler 
(2002), Hovaikimian et al (2001), and Ozkan (2001) among others. The literature in this area 
is largely based on Myers (1977) and is discussed in some detail in Ozkan (2001), while 
Ozkan (2001), Welch (2004). Gaud et al (2005) provide a review of this literature, focusing 
on firm size, performance, growth opportunities and risk. Hovaikimian et al (2004) among 
others  extend  this  analysis  to  discuss  and  explain  movements  in  capital  structure  and 
observed variations in the levels.  
Many models seeking to determine optimal leverage are based on trade-off theory. 
This suggests that in the presence of significant capital market imperfections and information 
                                                
7 Recent work in this area (see for example Roberts (2002) highlights the problems in estimating a dynamic 
version of (2) in order to investigate movements in optimal leverage. Most importantly, firms may not find it 
cost effective to adjust their debt ratios from year to year even if they are aware of the sub-optimality of the 
existing levels.   11
asymmetry, the performance of the firm is an important determinant of optimum leverage. 
Thus better performing firms tend to have higher leverage. In our analysis, we include two 
possible indicators of firm performance, Tobin’s Q as an indicator of market valuation, and 
profitability as an indicator of firm efficiency. In order to reduce the possible simultaneity 
bias, we use one-period lagged values of market valuation and profitability.
8  
An issue that authors in this area refer to, but seldom address in applied work is the 
importance of capturing the relationship between leverage and “available opportunities” for 
the firm to carry out investment projects. Theoretically, the prospects of the firm identifying 
major potential investment opportunities is linked to the leverage of the firm, an argument 
that is based on the work on Myers (1977) (for a review of this theoretical literature see 
Baker and Wurgler, 2002). The “available opportunities” variable is generally captured using 
growth (contemporaneous or lagged) at either the industry of firm level, or simply firm size. 
Alternatively,  past  R&D  (often  in  dummy  form)  is  employed  to  capture  future  growth 
opportunities. It is clear however that these are imperfect proxies. We adopt an alternative 
strategy, which is to employ a model from the factor demand literature (see for example 
Nickell (1979), Pfann (1996), or Thomsen (2000)) and estimate a model determining the 
optimal capital stock of the firm. Thus we are able to identify the extent to which a firm is 
operating above or below its optimal capital stock at a given point in time. This becomes 
important, not only for capturing future investment opportunities, but also for the asymmetric 
adjustment process towards a firm’s optimal level of leverage. The deviation of actual capital 
(K) from the corresponding optimal (K*), i.e., (K-K*)
9 is taken to be a measure of over-(or 
under)  investment.
10  This  variable  becomes  important  when  one  considers  the  central 
explanations  for  the  depth  of  the  recent  Asian  crisis,  that  over-lending  has  led  to  over-
investment. Thus we would expect a direct relationship between excess capital stock and 
leverage in our sample.  
Finally, we control for firm size and use natural logarithm of total sales as the relevant 
size variable. In particular, the firm size variable would account for the much-publicised 
hypothesis  that larger firms in  the  worst  affected  East  Asian countries found it easier to 
                                                
8 Profitability here refers to earnings before interest and taxes as a share of total assets. 
9 The econometric approach to modelling the optimal capital stock of the firm is discussed in the Appendix. 
Also note that we include both the nominal and the absolute deviation of actual capital stock from its optimal. 
The latter allows us to account for the possibility of non-linearity in this respect. 
10 We have also experimented with other possible variables like some measure of bankruptcy and interest 
coverage (as a measure of loan default of firms), but none of these variables turned out to be significant in our 
samples.    12
obtain  higher  levels  of  debt  finance  because  of  their  close  links  with  the  financing 
institutions..   
Causal analysis of our data (Table 4) suggests that there are three distinct sub-periods 
(1993-96, 1997-98 and 1999-2002). We therefore allow the coefficient estimates of a to vary 
across the sub-periods and estimate three models corresponding to the three sub-periods:  
02 1999 , ' 3
98 1997 , '
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   (3) 
 
We also perform Chow statistics to test for the instability of the coefficients over the sub-
periods. Results of this analysis are discussed in section 4.1.  
 
3.1.2. Dynamics of capital adjustment 
The ability of individual firms to adjust to equilibrium will vary across time. We use the fixed 
effects estimates of leverage (as explained in section 3.1.1) to generate the predicted values of 
optimum leverage (DE
*
it) and also its lagged value (DE
*
it-1) to be used in the second stage 
dynamic estimates based on the estimation of (1).
11  
It is likely that the potential speed of adjustment will differ between firms, depending 
on the situation of the firm, the level of leverage it has (and whether it has more or less than 
its equilibrium level) and a range of other variables including the distress it is operating 
under.  Thus the speed of adjustment is assumed to vary among firms, and is determined by a 
vector of variables, both real (e.g., PROFIT) and financial (e.g., SR). The approach then 
allows us to generate firm-specific estimates of speeds of adjustment. Among the possible 
determinants of the speed of adjustment, we first include firm size (SALES) and profitability 
(PROFIT) of sample firms. Larger and more profitable firms are more likely to have more 
flexibility in adjusting the actual leverage towards the optimal leverage and therefore may 
have a higher speed of adjustment.  
Secondly, we include the deviation of actual capital stock from the corresponding 
optimum, i.e.,  (K-K*). Most existing literature tends to presume a uni-directional adjustment 
mechanism,  rather  than  a  two-way  process  (with  potentially  asymmetric  speeds)  that  we 
                                                
11  Within  a  panel  framework,  one  still  has  the  issue  of  stability  of  coefficients  over  time,  though  with 
differenced data (used for the dynamic adjustment) this is potentially less of a problem. 
   13
hypothesise here. If K > K* the firm has excess capacity in capital and may find it easier to 
adjust  capital  downwards  towards  the  optimum  than  increasing  the  stock  of  capital;  this 
asymmetry in the adjustment process is captured by including |K-K
*| as well. While the firm 
may be able to adjust capital quickly if K>K
*, it may take more time to adjust the debt, e.g., 
by selling capital. If corporate governance is weak, firms may find it easier to adjust leverage 
towards  the  optimum  if  DE*>DE  (upward  adjustment)  than  if  DE*<DE  (downward 
adjustment). In this case too, we include |DE-DE*| to test for asymmetry in the adjustment 
process, if any.  
It is expected that firms with higher stock returns may find it easier to adjust DE 
towards the optimum because they could substitute equity finance for debt finance. In order 
to control for this financial effect, we include annual stock returns (SR).
12 It has often been 
alleged that faster growth of short-term debt (often coming from the foreign commercial 
banks)
13 in the East Asian economies in the 1990s contributed to the financial crisis, as short 
term creditors withdrew their capital in the face of the crisis. Although we cannot observe the 
share of foreign loans in total debt in our data set, we use share of short-term loan in total 
loan (SDTD). Inclusion of this variable would then allow us to test its effect on the speed of 
adjustment. In particular, a negative coefficient estimate of this variable would be suggestive 
of  a  lower  speed  of  adjustment  among  firms  with  higher  share  of  short-term  loan,  thus 
lending support to the problem of weak corporate governance and moral hazard. In a similar 
vein, an insignificant coefficient would indicate that firms with excess short-term leverage 
might not adjust faster, again confirming the moral hazard problem of bad loans in these 
countries.  
We also experimented with a number of variables that are used elsewhere to capture 
the distress under which a firm is operating. Compared with the better-off firms, behaviour of 
these distressed firms could affect the speed of adjustment. First, we tried to distinguish firms 
with negative equity (DE<0) from others (most of whom had very large debt). It is important 
to identify these firms with high debt and negative equity from others as they were typically 
relying on short-term loan. In fact the ratio of long-term debt to total debt remained very low 
for these firms, between 19% and 36% for all countries except those in Korea (where it was 
as high as 53%). Not surprisingly, these firms report significant losses. For almost all of these 
                                                
12 The stock return index represents the theoretical aggregate growth in value of a share over a given period (1 
year in our case), assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase additional shares at the closing price 
applicable on the ex-dividend date. 
13 A number of factors including faster economic growth and open trade policies pursued in these economies 
have been identified as causing the faster growth of short-term foreign loan in these economies.     14
firms, cash flow and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) are negative. It is however 
difficult to include a binary variable for DE<0 into a regression on change in DE since this is 
likely to introduce a simultaneity bias. But we believe that the profitability measure included 
in the analysis will to some extent control for the variation among this group of distressed 
firms. In addition, we experiment with two conventional measure of distress, e.g., cash flow 
as a share of current liability (CASHCL) and interest coverage INTCOV (interest payments 
as a share of cash flow) in the speed equation. It is difficult to retain both these variables in 
the final equation since they are highly correlated. Hence in the final set of estimates (shown 
in Table 6), we keep CASHCL as this yields the best set of estimates. Insignificance or a 
negative coefficient estimate of the distress variable in the speed equation could be taken as 
an indirect confirmation of the moral hazard problems in these poorly supervised economies.     
Finally a crisis dummy (CRISIS) is included to account for the externality effect of 
the crisis years (1997-98) on the speed of adjustment, if any.
14  
Taken together, one can specify an equation capturing the speed of adjustment:  
 
bit = b0 + b1 * (K-K*) it-1 + b2 * |K-K*|it-1 + b3 * (DE-DE*) it-1+b4 * |DE-DE*| it-1+  
     b5 * (SALES) it-1 +b6 * CRISISit-1 + b7* (PROFIT) it-1 + b8* (SR) it-1+  
        b9* INTCOV it-1 + b10*CASHCL it-1 +  b11*SDTD it-1   
bit = 0 if DEit = DEit-1 =0          (4) 
 
Substituting the values of bit from equation (4) into equation (1), one could obtain the 
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1
      (5)                   
where the dependent variable is ￿ it DE  = ( it DE - 1 - it DE ).  
In general our data covers a period of 1989-2002 for each firm, which in turn provides 
a panel of thirteen annual differences. However, given the missing observations and also 
allowing for the use of lags and instruments, we finally use a complete panel data of ten 
                                                
14The CRISIS variable is defined as follows: CRISIS =1 if year =97-98 and 0 otherwise.    15
years, namely, 1993-2002 in differences for each of the sample countries on which the partial 
adjustment equation (5) is estimated. 
 
Estimation method 
1.  Due to the inclusion of lagged change in DE ratios on the right hand side of equation 
(5), and given that the model is estimated within a panel framework, ordinary least 
squares cannot be applied. Rather, one has to use the generalised method of moments 
(GMM)  estimator  similar  to  that  suggested  Arellano  and  Bond  (1988,  1991) 
employing  instrumental variables.  This is  because,  within a  panel  framework,  the 
"lagged levels" variables are treated as being pre-determined. Here we employ the 
estimation procedure outlined in some detail by Sevestre and Trognon (1996). This 
approach is common for example in labour demand modelling, where a non-linear 
adjustment process is assumed. For further discussion of this, see Hamermesh (1995).  
 
Goodness of Fit Measure 
The multiple correlation coefficient squared R
2 and its adjusted value are routinely used in 
most models as a measure of goodness of fit. There are, however, problems of using R
2 in a 
regression model estimated by instrumental variable (IV) methods, as outlined by Pesaran 
and Smith (1994). As an alternative, we use two possible indicators of goodness of fit: (a) 
Pesaran  and  Smith  (1994)  generalised  R
2  commonly  abbreviated  as  GR
2.  (b)  We  also 
calculate a second measure, which is the correlation between predicted values of the change 
in leverage from GMM estimation and the actual values of the change. 
 
Diagnostic tests  
The  estimation  procedure  generates  heteroscedasticy  consistent  estimates  by  employing 
White’s correction. In addition, we perform the following tests: 
 
Exogeneity of instruments (Sargan’s test): In a regression model estimated by IV method, it 
is important to test for the exogeneity of instruments to ensure the consistency of estimates. 
Sargan (1976) proposed a general procedure in this respect that involves the examination of 
the covariance between IV residuals and the set of instruments used. Sargan derived a chi-
square test criterion by obtaining the asymptotic null distribution of the scaled covariance 
vector. This chi-square test is used here to test for exogeneity of instruments used.   16
  Serial Correlation: When estimating panel data models by GMM, the consistency of 
the estimator relies on the assumption of no serial correlation. We therefore test for 1
st and 2
nd 
order serial correlation, and with differenced data, to quote Doornik et al (2002) “there should 
be evidence of significant negative first order serial correlation in the differences residuals, 
and no evidence of second order correlation”. The appropriate AR1 and AR2 tests are then 
based on average residual autovariances, which are asymptotically distributed N(0,1).   
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this subsection, we present and analyse the two sets of estimates, namely, the first stage 
long-run fixed-effects estimates of optimal leverage (section 4.1) and second stage dynamic 
estimates (section 4.2). 
 
4.1.   Long-Run Fixed-effects Estimates  
Estimating the static (levels) models (3) generates estimates for each of the three sub-periods, 
with the choice between fixed effects models over the random effects determined by standard 
F test in each case. The estimates of the determinants of optimal leverage are summarised in 
Table 5.  
  While there are many similarities, the pattern is not uniform across the countries. The 
strongest  result  is  that  firms  with  higher  market  valuation  have  a  lower  dependence  on 
external debt, holding true for all the countries in our sample. The significance of firm values 
in explaining leverage reflects the importance of information asymmetry and agency costs. It 
is possible that firm valuation is correlated with growth opportunities so that the negative 
correlation between firm valuation and leverage is a proxy for the difficulty in borrowing 
against  intangible  growth  opportunities.  Secondly,  for  a  given  level  of  market  valuation, 
higher profitability significantly lowers leverage in all the worst affected countries in all the 
sub-periods.  Among the worst affected countries, significant size effect is however observed 
only among Thai firms where larger firms systematically have higher leverage. This could be 
due to the fact that larger firms have lower costs of external debt. It could also be attributable 
to weak governance especially for larger firms who could secure larger debt despite being 
inefficient. The effect is however opposite in Singapore and Hong Kong. Finally, deviation of 
actual  capital  stock  from  the  corresponding  optimum  is  important  in  some  cases.  Most 
notably, it is systematically significant in Korea for all the sub-periods and in all cases a 
larger  deviation  is  associated  with  higher  leverage  in  the  country;  the  latter  presumably   17
indicates a correspondence between over lending and over investment among Korean firms. 
  It is also interesting to closely examine the aspect of instability of some coefficients 
over the three sub-periods. It is clear that the effects of market valuation and profit margin on 
leverage do not change much across the sub-periods while effects of some other variables, 
e.g., firm size or K-K
*, do. Notably, the size effect of Indonesian and Thai firms or effects of 
excess capital among Malaysian seems to disappear during the crisis period. This is further 
confirmed by the Chow tests (see Table 5). 
  Finally,  we  use  the  fixed/  random  effects  estimates  to  generate  the  estimates  of 
optimal leverage. This allows us to examine (a) to what extent the actual leverage deviates 
from the optimal (
*
it it DE DE - ) and (b) if there is any association between excess capital 
stock and excess leverage. To this end, we derive the correlation between the two for every 
year and compare the trend in correlations for each country. This is summarised in Figure 3. 
Clearly, the strength of the association is consistently low among firms in the least affected 
countries. In contrast, the correlation is positive and more pronounced among firms in the 
worst affected countries. The Korean case is particularly notable, where the correlation by far 
exceeds that for firms in other countries, especially in the pre-crisis period. In the post crisis 
period  however  there  is  a  distinct change  in  the  pattern  (often a  lower  positive  or  even 




4.2. Estimates of the Speed of Adjustment  
Table 6 displays the estimates of bit’s and g for the selected countries in our sample for the 
period  1993-2002.  These  estimates  are  heteroscedastic  consistent  in  that  the  covariance 
matrix is adjusted for White’s correction. Two measures of goodness of fit are presented for 
each case. The first is the generalised r-squared (GR
2) for instrumental variable estimation 
(Pesaran and Smith, 1994), while the second is the more common square of the correlation 
between the actual and fitted values of the dependent variable. In general, there is evidence of 
good fit for differences data in each case. Secondly, P-values from the Sargan test are shown 
in the Table, fails to reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity in all cases. The tests for 
serial correlation (negative first order, positive second order) are also presented for each case, 
which confirm the absence of any serial correlation problem here.    18
The results vary between the sample countries, though some similarities are noted. 
Deviation of the actual capital stock from the optimal played a significant role in all cases. 
Specifically, the larger the nominal deviation of actual capital stock from the optimal one, the 
lower is the speed of adjustment. There is also evidence of significant asymmetry in the 
adjustment of leverage with respect to K-K*, as the absolute term is also significant and 
positive, suggesting that firms with only a small absolute deviation from K* do not find it 
worthwhile to attempt to adjust their leverage. A similar pattern is also observed with respect 
to nominal and absolute deviation of  it DE -
*
it DE  over the previous period. These estimates 
suggest  a  significant  correspondence  between  K-K*  and  it DE -
*
it DE   and  the  speed  of 
adjustment, which in turn is indicative of some degree of inertia/inability among sample firms 
to  adjust  the  actual  leverage  to  the  optimal  level,  thus  exhibiting  some  degree  of  moral 
hazard.  
We also note some significant differences in results pertaining to the worst affected 
countries. Most notably, the crisis dummy is significant for the worst affected countries while 
it remains insignificant for Singapore and Taiwan, both of which were least affected by the 
crisis. The coefficient is negative for Malaysia and Thailand, indicating that compared with 
other years, the speed of adjustment was slower for these firms during 1997-98 while the 
effect was just opposite in Korea and Indonesia.  
Firm performance, as measured by profit margin, plays a significant role for firms in 
the worst affected countries. More profitable firms in Korea and Thailand had higher speeds 
of adjustment, while those in Thailand seem to show signs of inertia. Our estimates also 
suggest that the speed of adjustment is lower among larger firms in Thailand. Among the 
worst  affected  countries,  the  coefficient  of  annual  stock  returns  is  significant  only  in 
Malaysia, such that higher annual stock returns enhance the speed of adjustment. The latter 
may be indicative of some degree of substitutability between debt and equity finance in the 
country.  
More interestingly, a higher share of short-term debt is associated with significantly 
lower speed of adjustment in the worst affected countries while a higher share of cash flow 
(in relation to current liability) is associated with higher speed among firms in most countries 
except Korea. Clearly, firms with more short-term debt need to adjust leverage faster, though 
this does not seem to be the case in our sample, suggesting evidence of weak corporate 
governance.  However  for  given  share  of  short-term  loan  access  to  more  cash  flow  is 
associated with faster speed of adjustment in the worst affected countries except Korea. For   19
given  share  of  short-term  debt,  Korean  firms  with  more  cash  flow  however  seem  to  be 
reluctant to adjust their leverage to the optimal and yet continue to be in business as usual.  
In addition to market frictions, annual changes in the optimal level of leverage are 
significant in explaining changes in actual leverage (captured by the estimate of g) in all the 
worst affected countries. The elasticity of changes in leverage with respect to the changes in 
the optimal leverage indicates the extent to which the firm is able to respond to external 
changes. In general, the estimate of g is positive and significant in most cases while the 
highest  value  of  the  estimate  is  observed  among  Korean  firms,  thus  demonstrating  the 
greatest ability of these firms to respond internally to changes in optimal leverage levels, for 
given values of other variables.  
  Finally,  we  use  the  coefficient  estimates  to  calculate  the  firm-specific  speeds  of 
adjustment for the selected countries. The overall distribution of the speeds of adjustment are 
summarised in Table 7A. The average is below 0.5 in all cases though the maximum is often 
considerably higher than 1 and varies across the sample countries. Among the worst affected 
countries, the lowest average speed is observed among Thai firms while the Malaysian firms 
had the highest average closely followed by Korean firms. With annual data, the inverse of 
the speed of adjustment is clearly the number of years a firm would take to fully adjust to its 
optimum level of leverage. This in turn means that the average Malaysian firms would take 3 
years to fully adjust, closely followed by Korean firms (just under 4 years). While Indonesian 
firms would take nearly 7 years, Thai firms would take more than double that time (nearly 16 
years) to reach their respective optimal levels. On an average, dependence on external finance 
is lower among Malaysian firms (Table 2) in our sample. The latter is further reflected in low 
average leverage (and at levels similar to the average leverage rates in the least affected 
countries)  and  greater  reliance  on  equity  finance  (Table  3)  among  Malaysian  firms.  In 
addition,  share  of  tangible  assets  in  total  assets  has  been  the  highest  among  the  sample 
countries for most of the sample period. Perhaps all these factors have resulted in a faster 
speed of adjustment among Malaysian firms.
15  
  Table 7B in addition shows the distribution of speeds of adjustment before, during 
and after the crisis in the selected countries. This further reveals that compared with the pre-
crisis period, the speed of adjustment was often significantly lower during the crisis years and 
then significantly increased during the post-crisis restructuring period in all the worst affected 
                                                
15 Although average leverage has been higher among the Korean firms in our sample, share of their current 
liability has been the lowest among all the sample countries (see Table 4); the latter may explain the relatively 
higher speed of adjustment among these firms.   20
countries.  In  contrast,  speed  of  adjustment  remained  more  stable  (but  low)  in  Singapore 
throughout the sample period. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
While  the  aggregate  macroeconomic  analysis  of  the  recent  Asian  Crisis  highlights  the 
problem  of  moral  hazard  of  bad  loans  in  poorly  supervised  and  regulated  East  Asian 
economies,  there  is  very  little  firm-level  analysis  to  characterize  it.  The  present  paper 
attempts to fill in this gap in the literature and focuses on the process of dynamic adjustment 
of the actual leverage towards the optimum.  
We  use  Worldscope  firm-level  panel  data from  four  worst  affected  countries  and 
present comparisons with three of the less affected countries. Our analysis for the period 
1993-2002 suggests that contrary to the general hypothesis, higher quality firms (with higher 
market valuation and profit margin) tend to have lower leverage in most sample countries 
while larger firms in Indonesia and Thailand tend to have larger leverage. These results are 
also suggestive of a close correspondence between excess capital stock and excess leverage 
in the pre-crisis period, especially in the worst affected countries.   
We examined the effects of a number of real and financial variables in the dynamic 
adjustment  process.  These  results  indicate  a  significant  degree  of  corporate  inertia  in 
adjusting actual leverage towards the optimal. This is particularly prevalent among firms with 
excess capital stock and higher share of short-term loans. Equally, these problems seem to 
beset the largest firms in Thailand, perhaps explaining the severity of the crisis there. These 
findings are indicative of the moral hazard problems of bad loans in poorly supervised and 
regulated economies where even relatively better off firms can continue to borrow and over-
invest  without  adjusting  their  capital  structure  towards  the  optimum.  This  inertia  is 
particularly  evident  during  the  pre-crisis  and  crisis  periods  though  our  estimates  tend  to 
suggest that the adjustment process was significantly speeded up in the post-crisis period.  
Clearly  the  least affected  countries  had  relied  less  on  debt  finance  and  Malaysia, 
among the worst affected countries, had relatively low share of debt finance in total external 
finance  (more  in  line  with  the  least  affected  countries).  This  is  further  reflected  in  the 
significant and positive coefficient of the annual stock return variable in the speed equation 
for Malaysian firms, who also had the highest speed of adjustment among the worst affected 
countries. Thus without much loss of generality one could argue that greater reliance on   21
equity markets could be one possible way out of the problem of weak corporate governance 
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TABLE. 1. NUMBER OF FIRMS IN SAMPLE COUNTRIES, 1989-2002 
  Korea  Malaysia  Singapore  Thailand  Indonesia  Taiwan  Hong Kong 
               
1989  75 




































































































































































































Note: Number in the parentheses give the corresponding number excluding the outliers in 
each sample. 
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TABLE 2. USE & COMPOSITION OF EXTERNAL FINANCE  





      new 
debt  
new equity  
Korea         
Pre-crisis  1989-1996  64.69  87.05  12.95 
Crisis  1997-1998  26.79  91.24  8.76 
Post-crisis  1999-2002  54.80  76.10  23.90 
Thailand         
Pre-crisis  1989-1996  37.47  56.87  43.13 
Crisis  1997-1998  17.97  76.63  23.37 
Post-crisis  1999-2002  11.00  74.93  25.07 
Indonesia         
Pre-crisis  1989-1996  34.60  72.52  27.48 
Crisis  1997-1998  31.48  90.73  9.27 
Post-crisis  1999-2002  11.86  84.88  15.12 
Malaysia         
Pre-crisis  1989-1996  30.10  63.86  36.14 
Crisis  1997-1998  21.85  75.80  24.20 
Post-crisis  1999-2002  22.73  68.57  31.43 
Hong Kong         
Pre-crisis  1989-1996  32.12  66.79  33.21 
Crisis  1997-1998  40.55  60.45  39.55 
Post-crisis  1999-2002  32.97  58.83  41.17 
Singapore         
Pre-crisis  1989-1996  29.28  59.70  40.30 
Crisis  1997-1998  46.87  62.44  37.56 
Post-crisis  1999-2002  20.67  56.95  43.05 
Taiwan         
Pre-crisis  1989-1996  25.96  81.04  18.96 
Crisis  1997-1998  -6.68  70.89  29.11 
Post-crisis  1999-2002  35.33  84.79  15.21 
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 TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF OBSERVED LEVERAGES, 1989-2002 
  Mean leverage      Mean leverage      Mean leverage      Mean leverage     
Year  |D/E|  D/E   Max  Min  |DE|  D/E  Max  Min  |DE|  D/E  Max  Min  |DE|  |DE|  Max  Min 
  Korea  Indonesia  Hong Kong  Malaysia 
1989  1.88  1.37  6.6  0.70  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.42  0.52  2.9  0.0  0.70  0.79  12.3  -2.6 
1990  2.41  1.78  12.1  0.41  3.7  0.77  2.17  0.0  0.42  0.49  2.8  0.0  0.41  0.50  3.7  0.0 
1991  3.19  3.10  24.2  0.36  2.5  0.52  3.89  0.0  0.55  0.61  3.1  0.0  0.36  0.42  2.5  0.0 
1992  3.04  2.74  20.5  0.36  5.0  0.63  1.82  0.0  0.49  0.55  3.1  0.0  0.36  0.41  5.0  0.0 
1993  2.61  2.63  17.8  0.49  13.6  0.65  1.65  0.0  0.42  0.47  2.2  0.0  0.49  0.55  13.6  0.0 
1994  2.66  2.65  23.3  0.49  3.1  0.71  2.29  0.0  0.48  0.50  2.4  0.0  0.49  0.48  3.1  -2.6 
1995  2.64  2.63  23.4  0.63  5.1  0.88  2.87  0.0  0.61  0.62  2.7  0.0  0.63  0.67  5.1  -1.8 
1996  2.86  2.87  26.1  0.80  5.5  0.99  3.08  0.0  0.60  0.59  3.1  -2.2  0.80  0.87  5.5  0.0 
1997  3.81  2.72  21.9  0.99  12.0  1.22  11.93  -28.7  0.52  0.50  2.3  -2.9  0.99  1.06  12.0  -1.2 
1998  2.51  2.13  22.0  1.16  9.1  1.62  33.05  -25.0  0.56  0.47  2.8  -2.8  1.16  0.97  9.1  -6.0 
1999  1.56  0.90  14.6  1.18  11.9  0.57  28.05  -15.7  0.56  0.43  3.2  -2.9  1.18  0.90  11.9  -6.2 
2000  1.82  1.00  26.5  1.02  13.0  -1.41  18.46  -143.8  0.43  0.40  3.2  -1.7  1.02  0.64  13.0  -6.7 
2001  1.59  1.13  10.1  0.95  8.8  0.83  30.95  -14.6  0.43  0.39  3.1  -2.7  0.95  0.49  8.8  -5.2 
2002  1.80  1.38  30.2  0.99  14.9  -0.88  35.53  -149.0  0.43  0.39  3.2  -3.3  0.99  0.55  14.9  -7.1 
year  |D/E|  D/E   max  Min  |DE|  D/E  max  min  |DE|  D/E  max  min 
  Taiwan  Thailand  Singapore 
1989  0.39  0.38  1.0  0.1  0.74  0.74  2.14  0.07  0.31  029  1.1  0.0 
1990  0.34  0.34  0.9  0.0  0.87  0.87  2.92  0.01  0.38  0.37  2.4  0.0 
1991  0.52  0.52  1.5  0.0  0.89  0.89  4.28  0.00  0.39  0.38  2.4  0.0 
1992  0.51  0.51  1.1  0.0  0.93  0.96  6.05  0.00  0.44  0.41  2.9  0.0 
1993  0.45  0.45  1.7  0.0  0.94  0.95  4.14  0.00  0.51  0.48  2.9  0.0 
1994  0.44  0.43  1.5  0.0  0.99  1.00  6.17  0.00  0.45  0.42  2.4  0.0 
1995  0.47  0.46  2.1  0.0  1.17  1.09  3.80  -7.16  0.51  0.48  2.7  0.0 
1996  0.51  0.49  2.4  0.0  1.33  1.20  6.08  -7.13  0.62  0.59  4.5  0.0 
1997  0.53  0.52  2.6  0.0  2.44  0.91  7.77  -14.51  0.69  0.67  5.1  0.0 
1998  0.65  0.63  5.9  0.0  1.95  1.10  9.17  -11.54  0.84  0.82  8.2  0.0 
1999  0.64  0.62  5.0  0.0  1.75  0.78  8.67  -12.85  0.62  0.57  4.1  0.0 
2000  0.69  0.67  5.8  0.0  1.59  0.80  7.68  -9.67  0.59  0.56  7.5  -1.1 
2001  0.69  0.65  5.3  0.0  1.36  0.76  8.72  -12.74  0.61  0.57  5.7  -1.5 
2002  0.67  0.64  5.9  0.0  1.58  0.60  9.20  -14.63  0.59  0.60  8.5  -1.6   28
Table 4. Selected characteristics of sample firms  
 























Korea               
1989-96  2.66  0.59  0.35  0.15  0.88  9.29  18.9 
1997-98  3.16  0.61  0.40  -0.06  -2.88  -22.23  9.9 
1999-2002  1.69  0.61  0.45  0.22  0.27  2.82  9.9 
Indonesia               
1989-96  0.70  0.75  0.39  0.53  0.27  2.33   
1997-98  3.54  0.70  0.41  0.11  -0.25  -11.66  13.1 
1999-2002  3.57  0.67  0.43  0.28  -0.03  -1.31  20.6 
Malaysia               
1989-96  0.53  0.77  0.61  0.44  0.14  2.78  0.30 
1997-98  1.08  0.72  0.76  0.26  0.16  4.15  3.63 
1999-2002  1.03  0.73  0.90  0.32  -0.56  -6.38  12.00 
Thailand               
1989-96  0.98  0.75  0.43  0.44  0.21  2.66  0.3 
1997-98  2.19  0.73  0.47  0.27  -0.53  -7.52  12.1 
1999-2002  1.57  0.68  0.46  0.40  0.11  1.23  11.8 
Hong 
Kong 
             
1989-96  0.50  0.75  0.65  0.48  0.54  6.57   
1997-98  0.54  0.77  0.57  0.27  0.00  1.99  1.8 
1999-2002  0.48  0.81  0.58  0.16  0.10  1.94  3.4 
Singapore               
1989-96  0.43  0.78  0.35  0.36  0.20  4.13   
1997-98  0.74  0.74  0.41  0.24  0.40  6.70   
1999-2002  0.58  0.79  0.39  0.29  0.12  3.66  1.1 
Taiwan               
1989-96  0.45  0.72  0.68  0.53  0.84  13.00   
1997-98  0.57  0.68  0.55  0.37  0.14  2.01   
1999-2002  0.64  0.70  0.55  0.38  0.23  3.32   
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Table 5.  Fixed-effects estimates of optimal leverage  
 
Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand  Hong Kong Singapore  Taiwan 























































































R-squared  .845  .567  .777  .762  0.648  .892  .900 
             
































































































































































































￿ F-stat refers to the rejection of fixed effects tested against the alternative of random effects.   30
Table 6. Dynamic estimates of leverage  
 
  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand  Hong 
Kong 

































































































































































































test  0.314  0.274  0.259  0.178  0.192  0.201  0.324 
GR
2  0.444  0.514  0.482  0.431  0.553  0.531  0.647 






































Note: * denotes significance at 10% or lower level and ‘**’ denotes the same at 1% or lower 
level. All estimates use White’s correction for heteroscedasticity.  
                                                
￿ The AR1 tests presented here and in table A2 are for negative serial correlation, following Doornik et al 
(2002)   31
 
 Table 7A. Distribution of speeds of adjustment in the sample countries  
 
 
Hong Kong   Indonesia   Korea   Malaysia  Singapore   Taiwan   Thailand  
mean  0.18894  0.15082  0.26357  0.215413  0.098283  0.303059  0.0932169 
St. dev  17.8125  15.32562  3.98187  0.737965  0.987565  0.263933  0.2755990 
median  0.1081  0.38200  1.51E-06  0.266812  0.150788  0.342359  0.149065 
max  631.9036  5.90888  6.48204  28.62558  26.45863  6.470119  3.291618 
min  0.00022  2.127E-05  0.000463  0.000534  5.6222E-05  0.00031  0.000249 
skew  34.0291  -12.0089 -8.134784  1.783668  -7.354186  -3.05219  3.327086 
 
 Table 7B. Distribution of speeds of adjustment before, during and after the crisis 
 
  1993-96  1997-98  1999-02  1993-96  1997-98  1999-02 
  Indonesia  Hong Kong 
mean  0.1014  0.05524  0.34642  0.12508  0.20123  0.15465 
st dev  2.55976  0.56037  0.45778  6.52292  5.12393  9.21823 
median  0.07263  0.09099  0.57779  0.10778  0.29692  0.28329 
max  1.83413  3.77037  5.90888  52.7208  631.904  28.5176 
min  0.00029  2.1E-05  0.00011  0.00025  0.00023  0.00035 
skew  16.4524  8.78116  11.4564  3.68706  -7.007  -1.872 
  Korea     Malaysia      
Mean  0.22163  0.12489  0.37108  0.20114  0.08899  0.28558 
st dev  0.28901  4.4266  6.67862  0.2748  0.39925  0.30004 
median  0.15757  0.01482  0.19  0.2004  0.12504  0.17425 
max  0.52786  0.61833  6.48205  4.46951  3.65053  28.6256 
min  0.00044  0.00055  0.00086  0.0003  0.00016  0.00095 
skew  0.63263  0.71422  1.42144  -0.147  -2.1183  27.4537 
  Singapore   Taiwan      
mean  0.08062  0.08316  0.12688  0.31506  0.20209  0.34839 
st dev  0.04466  0.03918  1.14118  0.3287  0.41112  7.85847 
median  0.08003  0.07609  0.06521  0.26558  0.15119  0.05161 
max  0.22235  0.28039  26.4586  1.19087  2.15476  6.47012 
min  5.6E-05  0.00037  0.00032  0.00061  0.00032  0.00082 
skew  2.46353  1.35567  19.2874  0.35438  0.98356  23.3264 
 Thailand            
mean  0.03848  0.03362  0.17558      
st dev  0.18311  0.17001  0.14349      
median  0.03904  0.04163  0.29449      
max  0.33352  0.71406  3.29162      
min  0.00025  0.00044  0.00091      
   32
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APPENDIX 
 
 Determination of optimal capital stock 
Before embarking on the determination of optimal leverage and the dynamic adjustment of 
actual leverage to the optimum, we first determine the optimal capital stock and its deviation 
from the actual since it plays an important role in our analysis. 
  We only observe actual capital stock K, but not the optimal capital stock K*. So as a 
first step, we need to determine K*. Standard models of the optimal level of capital services 
are based on the work of Nickell (1979), Pfann (1996), or Thomsen (2000) which makes use 
of a simple structural model of the capital market. Output (Q) allows for any exogenous 
change  in  local  output,  either  due  to  change  in  demand  in  the  product  market,  or  the 
relocation decision of the firm for example. However, the development of a firm’s capital 
stock is generally assumed to follow a partial adjustment process, as the firm moves to wards 
optimal capital levels. Partial adjustment arises because firms are presumed to operate in 
imperfect capital markets that prevents them from fully adjusting when financial structure 
deviates from its target and also prevent optimal funding of new investment spending. The 
primary hypothesis in this case is that the speed of adjustment coefficients is positive but less 
than unity, see for example Hall (1992), Nickell (1979). For empirical treatments of this type 
of model, see Barrell and Pain (1996) or Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1994) for example.  
We estimate the optimal capital stock using a standard fixed effects estimator, though 
this was tested against group means estimator and the dynamic fixed effects model following 
Arrellano and Bond (1989). compared with the estimates from the various procedures were 
very similar, and the (within) fixed effects estimates were employed to generate the optimal 
capital  stock  K*  in  our  sample.  A  further  consideration  here  is  the  larger  number  of 
observations  that  it  generates  compared  with  the  dynamic  model,  requiring  lags  and 
instruments.  
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Table A1. Number of firms, total observations in the dynamic estimates  
 





Indonesia           1994-2000 
Firms  114  105  114  67   
No of obs  474  105  302  67   
Korea          1994-2001 
Firms  40  40  38  39   
No of obs  298  115  113  78   
Malaysia          1994-2001 
Firms  200  200  200  176   
No of obs  1067  200  532  335   
Thailand          1994-2001 
Firms  147  147  128  102   
No of obs  674  147  353  174   
Hong 
Kong 
        1994-2001 
Firms  186  165  186  175   
No of obs  1002  165  499  337   
Singapore          1994-2001 
Firms  112  85  106  112   
No of obs  571  85  289  197   
Taiwan          1994-2002 
Firms  277  80  165  277   
No of obs  1003  80  475  448   
 
 
 
 
 